UNITED	STATES	BAN	KRU	PTCY	COURT
NORTHERI	N DISTR	ICT	OF	CALI	FORNIA

In re Case No. 02-54406-JRG

12 SUTTER'S PLACE, INC.,

Debtor. Chapter 11

ORDER GRANTING CLASS CERTIFICATION

I. BACKGROUND

Debtor operates a card club in San Jose, California. Haim Avidor was employed by Debtor pre-petition as a card dealer from September 1994 to August 2002. While in Debtor's employ, Debtor had (and Debtor still maintains) a company-wide practice of charging its dealers a fixed amount of money per hour from the dealers, presumptively from the dealers' tips. The amount of money collected differs based on the type of dealers - Poker section, California section, and Panguine dealers each pay a different hourly amount. These funds were pooled together and purportedly redistributed to other types of employees.

Avidor alleges that this policy and practice is illegal and believes he is owed additional compensation under the California Labor

Code. By order dated November 24, 2004, this court permitted Avidor to file a class proof of claim in this case. Avidor subsequently filed three proofs of claim on behalf of the class he seeks to represent -- all of the former and current dealers employed by Debtor between August 8, 1998 and the present. One proof of claim seeks damages for the period of up to four years before the petition date (August 8, 1998 - August 8, 2002); the second proof of claim seeks a priority claim for wages earned but not paid in the 90 days before the petition date (May 10, 2002 - August 8, 2002); and the third proof of claim seeks an administrative claim for post-petition wages due. Avidor now moves for certification of the class over Debtor's objection.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs class actions and is applicable to a contested proof of claim through Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 7023 and 9014 at the court's discretion. A party seeking class certification bears the burden of proof and must meet each of the requirements of Rule 23(a) and at least one of the requirements of Rule 23(b). The four basic requirements under Rule 23(a) are: (1) numerosity; (2) typicality; (3) commonality; and (4) adequacy of representation. Rule 23(b)(2) permits a class action to provide injunctive relief where the defendant has acted with respect to the class as a whole. Rule 23(b)(3) permits a class action if the questions of law or fact common to the members predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members and a class action is superior to other means available for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.

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III. DISCUSSION

Avidor seeks a single class certification for his three proofs of claim under FRBP 7023. Debtor objects to the motion <u>inter alia</u> that: (1) the tip pool is lawful; (2) Avidor has no standing to bring an action under California Labor Code § 351; (3) Debtor can adjudicate and proofs of claim filed by the dealers on an individual basis; and (4) Avidor did not work for Debtor post-petition and cannot adequately represent the class. After review of all the papers and consideration of oral argument, the court finds Avidor meets all of the requirements for class certification.

A. Requirements of Rule 23(a)

- (1) <u>Numerosity</u>. Avidor asserts that there are over 428 potential class members, so the proposed class is sufficiently numerous that joinder of all parties is impracticable. <u>Jordan v. Los Angeles County</u>, 669 F.2d 1311, 1319 n.10 (9th Cir. 1982), <u>vacated on other grounds</u>, 459 U.S. 810 (1982).
- (2) Typicality. Claims are "typical" "if they are reasonably coextensive with those of absent class members; they need not be substantially identical." Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998). Avidor's claims are typical because he challenges the legality of the tip pool system. This challenge raises common questions of fact and law amongst all of the class members and those common questions predominate. Differences in the amount various dealers contributed to the tip pool do not undermine commonality, since the relief sought is against the same course of conduct by Debtor. Likewise, the fact that Avidor has not worked for Debtor post-petition does not undermine commonality because the tip pool system has not changed pre- and post-petition.

- (3) <u>Commonality</u>. In his proofs of claim, Avidor challenges the legality of the tip pool system. This challenge raises common questions of fact and law amongst all of the class members and the common questions of law and fact predominate. Differences in the amount various dealers contributed to the tip pool do not undermine commonality, since the relief sought is against the same course of conduct by Debtor.
- (4) Adequacy of representation. Avidor and his counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class since the interests of Avidor are the same as the class -- proving the illegality of the pooled tip scheme and obtain prospective injunctive relief, restitution, and damages for past violations. Avidor can represent the post-petition priority employees because this appears to be a solvent case and all classes of creditors will be paid in full from the estate. Further, Avidor's counsel has prosecuted a number of class actions for employees including some involving other California casinos and card clubs and has the financial and personnel resources to prosecute this class claim.

Debtor asserts that Avidor has no standing to bring an action under California Labor Code § 351 and thus class certification should be denied. However, Debtor misstates the law. A court should not address the class certification issue in the instance where a plaintiff has not suffered an injury "directly arising from or connected with the wrong alleged." 1 Alba Conte and Herbert B. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 3:19 (4th ed. 2002). That is not the case here. Avidor alleges that Debtor took money from him and other dealers for the allegedly illegal tip pool. Whether or not Avidor has standing to pursue the alleged wrong under California Labor

Code § 351 does not preclude this court from certifying Avidor's class.

B. Requirements of Rule 23(b)(2)

Avidor's proof of claim satisfies FRCP 23(b)(2) which permits a class action to provide injunctive relief where the defendant has acted with respect to the class as a whole. Here a major goal of the proof of claim are to require Debtor to change or eliminate its allegedly illegal pooled tip scheme. Debtor has refused to alter or eliminate that practice and class certification is appropriate.

C. Requirements of Rule 23(b)(3)

Even if Avidor's proofs of claim did not satisfy Rule 23(b)(2), they satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). Matters to be considered in applying Rule 23(b)(3) are: (1) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (2) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (3) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the bankruptcy court; and (4) the difficulties likely to be encountered in managing the class action.

Here common issues of law and fact predominate the litigation and class resolution is superior to any other method of adjudicating this controversy. First, adjudicating individual claims in this court or before the labor commissioner is not superior because the claims are novel and should be decided in one action. Moreover, injunctive relief is not available before the labor commissioner and a trial in front of the labor commissioner could result in a second trial in state court. Also, there is no interest expressed by other class members to control individually the prosecution of this action.

Second, the court is aware of no other actions pending against Debtor related to this controversy. Third, it is desirable to have all of these claims adjudicated in the bankruptcy court because moving these matters to state court would delay Debtor from exiting bankruptcy after settling with the City of San Jose. Finally, the court does not anticipate any difficulties in managing the class because the class size is relatively small, the amounts due are relatively small, and there are no specialized issues requiring individual resolution or other class difficulties.

Class certification is the superior method of resolving the liability underlying the claim. Once liability is established, determining the damages due each class member can be expeditiously and effectively calculated. The amount of damages is based on the flat amount charged each dealer, and the actual tips received by each dealer is irrelevant.

IV. CONCLUSION

The main issue of dispute is whether the tip pool policy that has been in place with respect to Debtor's card dealers is legal. Debtor claims it is; Avidor claims it is not. That issue of fact and law is common to all dealers and needs to be determined prior to the determination of any proof of claim of the dealers against Debtor. It is appropriate to determine that issue in one class action proceeding rather than in numerous individual objection to claim proceedings as requested by Debtor.

Avidor has meet his burden of proving that each of the requirements of FRCP 23(a) has been met -- numerosity, typicality, commonality, and adequacy of representation -- and also the

1	requirements of FRCP 23(b)(2) and FRCP 23(b)(3). His class is
2	certified for all three proofs of claim.
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4	DATED:
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6	JAMES R. GRUBE
7	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
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1 Case No. 02-54406 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 6 7 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 **CERTIFICATE OF MAILING** 9 I, the undersigned, a regularly appointed and qualified Judicial Assistant in the office of the Bankruptcy Judges of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose, California hereby certify: 10 11 That I, in the performance of my duties as such Judicial Assistant, served a copy of the Court's ORDER GRANTING CLASS CERTIFICATION by depositing it in the United States Mail, First 12 Class, postage prepaid, at San Jose, California on the date shown below, in a sealed envelope addressed as listed below. 13 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct. 14 15 Executed on ______ at San Jose, California. 16 LISA OLSEN 17 18 19 Office of the U.S. Trustee Daniel I. Barness, Esq. U.S. Courthouse/Federal Bldg. SPIRO, MOSS, BARNESS & HARRISON 20 280 S. First St., Rm. 268 11377 West Olympic Blvd., Fifth Floor San Jose, CA 95113 Los Angeles, CA 90064 21 Wendy W. Smith, Esq. Timothy J. Kolesnikow, Esq. LAW OFFICES OF BINDER & MALTER LAW OFFICES OF TIMOTHY J. KOLESNIKOW 22 2775 Park Avenue 2250 East Imperial Highway, Suite 200 23 Santa Clara, CA 95050 El Segundo, ĈA 90245 Sharon Kirsch, Esq. Marwa Elzankaly, Esq. 25 McMANIS FAULKNER & MORGAN 50 West San Fernando Street, 10th Floor San Jose, CA 95113 26 27